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Public secrets in public health:
Knowing not to know while making scientific knowledge
A B S T R A C T
Unknown knowns—or “public secrets”—may play an
integral part in publicly funded medical science. In
one large transnational field research site in Africa,
such unknowing pertains to vital material
inequalities across the relations of scientific
production. These inequalities are open to
experience but remain often unacknowledged in
public speech and scientific texts. This silence is not
usually achieved by suppressing knowledge but
through linguistic convention and differentiation
between places and moments of knowing and
ignorance. Switching between known and unknown
according to situation and interlocutor is an
important, largely implicit skill that maintains
relations necessary to conduct clinical
research—linking bodies, lives, institutions, and
technologies across differentials of resources,
expertise, and power. Unknowing, then, facilitates
research; and it shapes the resulting work and
perpetuates the political and economic
contradictions that pervade the context and the
research endeavor itself. Unknowing thus poses a
challenge for conventional anthropological modes of
critique and engagement. [Africa, science, medical
research, ignorance, ethics, justice]
Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen.
—T. W. Adorno,MinimaMoralia
“U
nknowing” can be a significant dimension of scientific
medical research: Those involved in advancing impor-
tant scientific knowledge know certain aspects of the
reality they work on and in and yet do not know, do
notwant to know, should not know, or actively unknow
them by way of oversight, ignorance, discursive conventions, and alterna-
tive terminology. Drawing on an ethnographic study of transnational sci-
ence in Africa, I analyze the contribution of unknowing to public health
research. “Public secrets” (Taussig 1999), unknown knowns, pertain here,
I argue, to vital material inequalities across the relations of scientific pro-
duction, which are open to experience but absent from public speech and
scientific texts.
This unknowing is not usually achieved by suppressing knowledge but
is actively produced through linguistic conventions, irony, and differentia-
tion between places of knowing and ignorance. Switching between known
and unknown according to situation and interlocutor maintains relations
necessary to conduct clinical research—productively linking bodies, lives,
institutions, and technologies across differentials of resources, expertise,
and power. Unknowing is, then, a condition of scientific knowledge pro-
duction under given material conditions; in turn, it shapes this scientific
work and sustains and exacerbates some of its inherent political-economic
contradictions.
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African laboratories
The trope of Africa as a laboratory has been popular in Eu-
ropean thinking about Africa for over a century, first, among
colonial doctors and administrators who liked to describe
their work as experiments and, later, in thewritings of histo-
rians, sociologists, and anthropologists about these endeav-
ors (see, e.g., Bonneuil 2000; Lachenal 2010; Tilley 2011).1
Themetaphor draws our attention to the prominence of sci-
entific, notably, medical, research in imaginaries of Africa
and, at the same time, to the tentative, exploratory nature,
and often failure, of external governmental interventions on
the continent. These two features have recently gained re-
newed salience, driven partly by the exceptional attention
bestowed on the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which for a while ap-
peared to be the continent’s main problem, and partly by
growing transnational flows of funding in response to this
and other health problems.
Medical issues are high on the agenda of external inter-
ventions in Africa today, and, because of the nature of the
most prominent health problems and of the organizational
and economic structures by which they are addressed, sci-
entific investigations remain central. Indeed, research and
intervention are often simultaneous, intertwined endeav-
ors rather than experiments preceding interventions as
pilot studies or succeeding them as evaluations—as ev-
idenced by the current excitement in the global health
field over “evaluations” and “implementation science” (e.g.,
Padian et al. 2011). This landscape, in which the bound-
aries between governmentality and scientific investiga-
tion are porous, has led some anthropologists—giving the
old African laboratory trope a new lease on life—to des-
ignate “experimentality” as the dominant social–political
paradigm of Africa today (Nguyen 2009; Rottenburg
2009).
Crucial nodes of this transnational order are the hand-
ful of large-scale medical research sites that—especially
since the end of the last century—have emerged across the
continent.2 These sites usually link a local scientific institu-
tion, such as a parastatal research institute, a university, or
a teaching hospital, to a European or U.S. scientific agency,
university, or charity (sometimes to several). Drawing on
cutting-edge scientific infrastructure, these “centers” or
“field stations” access specific territories—sometimes con-
stituted as “demographic surveillance areas”—and health
facilities. Employing hundreds, sometimes over a thousand
qualified staff, they involve hundreds of thousands of in-
habitants in their surroundings in scientific surveillance,
trials, and innovative interventions—with significant pos-
itive health impact as a side effect. These programs’ an-
nual budgets run in the tens of millions of dollars, derived
from theNorthern partners, and their publications advance
medical knowledge of Africa and shape national govern-
ment policy and international guidelines, technical stan-
dards, and interventions.
The concentration of scientific medical research in
Africa in these “field stations” associated with parastatal
national science bodies—rather than, say, based in na-
tional universities or government ministries—is driven, on
the one hand, by changes in science: notably, increasing
cost and rapid turnover of high-tech apparatus (e.g., in im-
munology and genomics), the rapid pace of technical in-
novation, and rising quality standards set by, for example,
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the In-
ternational Organization for Standardization. All of these
changes require some concentration and protection of sub-
stantial investments (see Geissler in press). On the other
hand, the evolution of collaborative African research sta-
tions has been shaped by declining standards and scientific
possibilities in ordinary, entirely state-fundeduniversity de-
partments, hospitals, and laboratories across Africa (see,
e.g., Okeke 2010), caused by economic and political crisis
and privatizations since the late 1970s, which makes tech-
nical and financial contributions of outside partners indis-
pensable. The combination of these factors—capitalization
and acceleration of global science and deprivation of local
scientific and medical landscapes—results in the contrac-
tion of valid scientific inquiry into enclaves.
If African health science once dreamed of expanding
modernity’s reach across national territory (as in impe-
rial colonization or postcolonial nation-building—“Africa
as a laboratory”), using large cadres of public health staff,
networks of field stations down to divisional level, and
closed-circuited interministerial action (see Geissler 2011;
Malowany et al. 2011; Ombongi 2011), the contempo-
rary global configuration of African laboratories recon-
stitutes technical modernity as an archipelago of a few
high-powered and well-resourced islands of global science,
connected to one another and to the centers of scien-
tific excellence and policy by long-distance flows of knowl-
edge, materials, and resources (for this geography, see, e.g.,
Ferguson 2006; Mbembe 2002).
This peculiar geography of medical science in Africa—
sharp boundaries between research sites and their sur-
roundings and hopping relations to distant overseas
centers—makes for marked confrontations with inequality
for those working at these sites. This is, then, the underlying
theme of this article: the inequality in transnational public
health research and the scandalon—the “stumbling stone,”
disturbance, or trigger for thought or ethical impulse—
that it may entail. Specifically, I propose that, as a coun-
tercurrent to the scientific project of making the unknown
known—rendering a dangerous landscape of disease legi-
ble and navigable—certain facts about the world, including
vital inequalities, are here “unknown” or, rather, handled—
inMichael Taussig’s (1999) terms—as “public secrets.”
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The anthropology of unknowing
To anthropologists, “knowledge” is a central concern. Ear-
lier distinctions between knowledge and belief—with sci-
entific truth as standard—have given way to the relativist
multiplication of local “knowledges” and emphasis on “in-
digenous” knowledge (see, e.g., Hobart 1993; Horton 1967;
Worsley 1997), but knowledge remains the positive sub-
stance of our scholarly efforts. Accordingly, scientific re-
search is often examined by anthropologists as generat-
ing, exchanging, or contesting knowledge (e.g., Latour and
Woolgar 1986; Traweek 1988; Woolgar 1982) or, in a rela-
tivist vein, as dominating “other” knowledges with a univer-
sal scientific one (e.g., Turnbull 2003).
Not knowing has often been treated in a common-
sensical manner, as lack of knowledge—equivalent to ig-
norance, as absence of a specific kind of knowledge, or
as a lacuna filled by erroneous belief, for example, by
“false” consciousness. Studies of “ignorance” have occa-
sionally turned analytical interest to the substance of not
knowing itself, for example, describing the ignorance (vs.
indigenous knowledge) produced by allegedly reductionist
development practices (e.g., Hobart 1993) or even inten-
tionally promoted by (nefarious) actors such as the tobacco
industry (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008). However, in these
approaches, nonknowledge is also measured against the
standard of true knowledge, and the constructive contribu-
tion of not knowing to social associations and processes is
only partially recognized.
The creative side of unknowing has, of course, emerged
in earlier anthropological analyses of secrecy (e.g., Barth
1975), which drew attention to the social importance of
uneven distributions and flows of knowledge, but even
there, the positive effort of making things unknown and the
meanings and experiences attached to not knowing within
regimes of secrecy did not attract much attention. Mostly,
“not knowing” has remained tied into the duality implied
by the negative prefix and has rarely been appreciated as a
creative social form in its own right.
Preceded by Murray Last’s (1981) early article on
“the importance of knowing about not knowing,” more
recently, anthropologists have, from different angles and
ethnographic fields, drawn attention to nonknowledge,
gaps in knowing, concealment, and ignorance (Green 2009;
Mosse 2005; Riles 1998, 2006; Strathern 1999; Wagner 1984),
suggesting that nonknowing, like knowledge, can link (and
separate) actors and produce, shape, and cut networks, col-
laborations, and social processes—contrary to what its con-
ception as a nonentity would suggest. In particular, aware-
ness of ignorance or conscious not knowing—the “present
absence” of knowledge—has been shown to be a procre-
ative force (Højer 2009). Social studies of science have in
this regard especially thought about the importance of not
knowing in relation to scientific experiments as a source of
validity—as in randomization and blinding—and as a per-
formative tool that may serve particular interests or bolster
the authority of those deemed capable of overcoming ambi-
guity and equipoise, for example, in the context of pharma-
ceutical industry information politics (e.g., McGoey 2009).
Describing this as “unknowing”—rather than as,
say, intuitive, affective, habitual, or embodied kinds of
knowing—is a choice, motivated partly by its contrast
to (scientific) knowledge—explicit, peer reviewed, printed,
and imbued with superior truth status. “Unknowing” delin-
eates the contours of a problem, which, on further scrutiny,
is as much about exclusion and the maintenance of the
boundaries of legitimate knowledge as it is about the in-
clusion, in social practice, of other invisible, silent, or prac-
tical ways of knowing (and about shifts, and translations,
between these). Unknowing is, then, not the opposite of
knowing; the pair of terms helps, instead, to describe the
work invested in, and the effects engendered by, maintain-
ing this politically salient division.
In relation to Africa, nonknowledge, in the forms of
vagueness, dissimulation, elision, andmirage has also been
evoked by anthropologists with regard to contemporary
“millennial” political-economic regimes that reconfigure
the relation between knowledge or truth and their vari-
ous others (e.g., Comaroff and Comaroff 2000; Ferguson
2006; Ferme 1999; Geschiere 1999; Mbembe 2001; Meyer
1999). In these new regimes of knowledge, nonknowl-
edge is actively produced andmaintained, sometimes serv-
ing, although not necessarily directly, specific political and
economic interests, at other times proliferating in less de-
terminate ways. While epistemic ambiguity, crucially in the
form of rumors, has been part of colonial regimes (White
2000; see Hunt 1999), it seems to have proliferated in
postcolonial African politics (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo
2004). The line between known and not known becomes
blurred in a postrelativist fashion: The two do not exclude
one another, and yet they cannot be collapsed into “alterna-
tive” knowledges. Power can draw nurture from uncertain-
ties and fear generated by the unknown, or it can legitimate
authority with superior knowledge.
Emphasizing the political import of unknowing,
Taussig (1999) argued that what is known but must not
be articulated in a given societal arrangement—what he
called “public secrets,” notably pertaining to hierarchy
and domination—is constitutive of social order through a
double bond with power: making domination unspoken,
silencing critique and resistance, and exacerbating power
differentials, since the force of making violence unknow-
able exceeds that of the violent act itself. Power rests thus
not just in knowledge; “unknown knowns” are the apotheo-
sis of power. This applies to Melanesian secret cults as
much as to European fascisms (see Pitt-Rivers 1971), where
Taussig (1999) finds his key cases. In this article, I explore
the contribution of unknowing to social order in a much
more benevolent and self-consciously progressive situation
than the conservative or reactionary regimes referenced
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by Taussig, in an order that is not bent on maintaining
social order and inequality but, on the contrary, pursues
epistemic and social transformation, amelioration and
justice: public health research.
Nonknowing in knowledge making
I take orientation from these anthropologies of unknow-
ing—of its productivity and political and economic
import—to examine a large transnational bioscientific
collaboration in Africa, for which—notwithstanding its aim
to make scientific knowledge—nonknowledge is founda-
tional and unknowing an active practice within knowledge
making. My guiding question is how (and why) a group
of people that is brought together by the scientific pursuit
of truth with a view to transforming both knowledge and,
through it, the world, retains—indeed creates—zones of
unknowing at the core of its practices.
I drawmainly on several years of fieldwork in anAfrican
city with a high prevalence of HIV and a corresponding in-
tensity of HIV research, conducted collaboratively by na-
tional medical research institutions of a North American
and an African nation, which I refer to as, respectively,
the Government Health Agency (GHA) and the National
Clinical Research Organization (NCRO).3 Many of my ob-
servations are general in nature, drawing on comparative
experiences in diverse large field sites in Africa; somemore-
specific descriptions are drawn from a particular clinical
trial (below, “the CT”) that involved a large group of ur-
ban mothers and babies for several years in a successful in-
tervention and clinical, lab, and behavioral data collection
and that also gave participants excellent medical care and
support. (See Figure 1.)
The African partner in my main site, NCRO, is a paras-
tatal organization, founded, like many comparable orga-
nizations across Africa, in the late 1970s and consisting
of several regional centers. The NCRO center where my
colleagues and I worked is one of the best-funded and
most productive of these sites, largely because of the suc-
cessful engagement of overseas partners and, in particu-
lar, the collaboration with the GHA. Since its foundation, it
has expanded steadily, becoming one of the best-equipped
sites for field- and laboratory-based bioscience in Africa. By
2009, it had over 1,000 staffmembers (including only a good
dozen expatriates), drawing on an annual budget in excess
of $30 million to conduct research involving hundreds of
thousands of participants in trials and surveillance.
The collaboration is the biggest employer apart from
the civil service in the wider region; its staff benefit from
good salaries, and although, for budgetary reasons, col-
laborative contracts can only run for a maximum of one
year, many staff have enjoyed continuous employment for
many years, even decades, on consecutive projects. Jobs
are highly coveted and competitive also because they of-
fer educational opportunities and scientific exposure. The
Figure 1. Clinical trial participant and doctor at research clinic in Africa.
Original painting by research staff member J. A. Ondiek. Courtesy of the
artist.
same applies to research participation, which entails sub-
stantial health care benefits for study volunteers, relatives,
and communities and which is regarded by most people as
highly desirable.4 “Being with GHA” is something few if any
local residents would decline.
The GHA–NCRO collaboration consists of a main field
station in a rural location outside a city, where adminis-
tration, data processing and analysis, and laboratories are
enclosed in amodern campus with catering facilities, semi-
nar rooms, and so on, which, to protect considerable mate-
rial resources, is clearly demarcated andwell protected. The
collaboration maintains two custom-built, well-equipped
research centers adjacent to government hospitals, which
conduct hospital-based clinical research and coordinate
field research in surrounding areas; most of the daily data
collection and some clinical procedures are conducted in
smaller government health facilities (which, in turn, benefit
from infrastructural improvements, staff, and supplies) as
well as in participants’ homes; a minor semipermanent in-
stallation in specially designed containers deployed next to
a government dispensary serves as temporary housing for
one trial.
“Unknown knowns” pertain in this site to experiences
of material differences across the scientific “trial commu-
nity” (Geissler 2011)—the study participants and research
workers, scientists of different origin, government officials
and doctors, academic institutions, health facilities, and
state bodies who are connected by medical research work.
Inequalities regarding the conditions of life, which are the
raison d’eˆtre of transnational public health research, are ac-
tively unknown in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. In
public speech, professional conversations, and scientific re-
ports, these appear at times not to be known, whereas—
inverting the logic of a double-blind randomized trial—
most (but not all) of those involved do “know,” see, and
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experience the allegedly unknown materialities and do
speak about them or respond to them in certain situations.
As a result, material differences are simultaneously known
and not known, constituting a “public secret” of sorts (Taus-
sig 1999), in which knowing what and how not to know con-
stitutes a foundation of social organization and process.
In the first part of my discussion below, I lay out some
of the basic rules of engagement that characterize present
scientific work in this site (representative of other African
sites I have visited in my research). I emphasize the stress
placed on autonomy and material independence, or im-
material equality—as expressed in idioms of voluntariness,
choice, partnership, and so on—that shapes both expec-
tations about research participation and practices of sci-
entific collaboration. I suggest that this historically situ-
ated rendering of scientific work in Africamakes differences
inherently problematic. In the remainder of the article, I
observe concrete engagements between scientific workers
(from international scientists to locally recruited fieldwork-
ers and volunteers) and study participants. I show how,
while producing scientific facts, people invest effort in “un-
knowing” difference. In doing so, they neither deny, hide,
nor ignore it, yet they do not establish it as explicit truth.
Rather, they oscillate between knowledge and nonknowl-
edge, exempting certain areas from the wider pursuit of
epistemological closure and contradicting scientific com-
mitments to a correspondence theory of knowledge. Un-
knowing serves to make scientific collaboration feasible; to
link bodies, lives, institutions, funding, and technologies
across wide differentials of resources, expertise, and power;
and to produce, under given political, economic, andmoral
conditions, valid scientific knowledge. But, I argue, this fea-
sibility has ethical and political costs; short of an easy solu-
tion, closer scrutiny of unknowing and what it does to re-
sulting knowledge might be of use.
The prominence of unknowing in this situation poses a
challenge for anthropological analysis: Classic forms of en-
lightenment critique—iconoclasm and revelation—which
privilege knowing over not knowing, reach their limits. Nei-
ther “telling the truth,” replacing alleged ignorance with
knowledge, nor the familiar anthropological celebration of
diverse knowledges has much purchase if people can tell
truths from untruths and habitually negotiate both regis-
ters. Instead, attention to the work of not knowing itself—
neither opposed to nor like referential knowledge of social
reality—is required.
(Un)Knowing difference
Research in Africa: A science of difference
Medical science—claims to universal truth, based on stan-
dardized and reproducible methods, negotiated through
open debate and scholarly consensus, and aiming for trans-
formations of knowledge and the world—has been pro-
duced in Africa for over one century, and since its inception,
it has involved material disparities. Indeed, differences in
the conditions of life and well-being, including disease dis-
tribution, nutrition, and health care standards—are at the
core of what used to be called “overseas” medical research:
They give it moral legitimacy as a social justice project, de-
termine its focus on “tropical” diseases, and allow investi-
gations of diseases and bodily states that are found in Africa
but not (or less commonly) in Europe or North America.
Such research involves associations between scientists
and institutions in and outside Africa—not only because all
science engages networks of consensus production but also
because certain forms of expertise and technological, orga-
nizational, and financial resources were and are not widely
available within Africa. African science has thus always in-
volved relationships across material difference, not only
the epistemologically charged one between cosmopolitan
scientists and their African study subjects but also those
among scientists, employers and employees, technologies,
academic and health care institutions, and their nations of
origin.
These differences are a source of potential friction (see,
e.g., Hoppe 2003; Hunt 1999; Leach and Fairhead 2007;
Packard 2007; Vaughan 1991), as underlined by rumors
about abuse of power and economic exploitation (see, e.g.,
Geissler 2005; Geissler and Pool 2006; White 2000). The
challenge of working together across material differences
can be addressed in different ways, depending on whether
scientific work is conceptualized as, for example, imperial
reconnaissance, colonial welfare, socialist internationalism,
or development aid, to mention but a few of the earlier
moral frameworks of tropical medicine. These older ap-
proaches explicated difference by establishing a hierarchy
between Europe and Africa, and between science and its
subjects, through idioms of, respectively, scientific racism,
paternalism, or more recently, solidarity and aid. By con-
trast, contemporary descriptions of medical research in
terms of “collaboration” or “partnership” are more careful
in addressing inequality.
The age of collaborative science
Epidemiological difference and, notably, “diseases of
poverty” remain the focus and justification of transna-
tional medical research collaborations. However, while
older regimes of tropical medicine solved the problem of
difference by hierarchical encompassment, today—and
maybe particularly in the North American–African relations
discussed here—hierarchy and dependence are distinctly
unpopular ways of rendering difference, partly because
of their connotations of colonial hegemony but also be-
cause such hierarchies can imply responsibilities and
lasting commitments for the dominant party and moral
17
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entitlements for its subjects. Instead of paternalistic
inclusion, the present regime is premised on freedom,
emphasizing the autonomy and independence of the
involved entities. The associations that produce scientific
knowledge—relations with study subjects as well as among
colleagues, institutions, and nations—are here not to be
construed in terms of material interdependence, com-
parability, and, thus, recognized inequality. The explicit
demarcation of material difference—such as in notions of
race, poverty, underdevelopment, and justice—is replaced
by indifference to materiality. For scientific work to be ethi-
cally sound, “partners” and “participants” in collaborative
research are to meet as equals.
The postulate of indifference and equality—not in a
concrete material but in a narrower legal and communica-
tive sense—applies to the individual human under study
(the autonomous participant or “volunteer” who signs con-
sent forms) and to the research staff employed by the col-
laboration (working on comparatively attractive short-term
contracts). And it applies to institutions (and nations) en-
gaged through memoranda of understanding or collabora-
tive agreements. On different scales, associations that con-
stitute the scientific network are imagined as voluntary
associations between free, independent entities. Collabora-
tive agreements between institutions, contractual relations
with staff, and informed consent given by research partici-
pants are premised on voluntariness and choice. Autonomy
has become foundational for the scientific endeavor; this is
particularly evident in bioethics.
Bioethics and the ethos of collaboration
“Bioethics,” one contemporaryway of definingwhat is good
scientific work, have over recent years crystallized in suc-
cessive guidelines and in the mid-1990s in the precepts of
Good Clinical Practice (GCP), the global standard for phar-
maceutical research, which regulates work with study sub-
jects, now termed “participants” or “volunteers.”5 GCP is
a contemporary equivalent of older moral constitutions of
science in Africa, such as imperial self-interest, colonial
responsibility, or postcolonial solidarity—translated into
detailed rules. While remnants of the previous moralities
persist in the contemporary formulation, its core value—
autonomy—which has gradually risen to prominence in
medical ethics over the past half-century, implies a shift in
emphasis: The research participant is not a subject of con-
trol, compassion, or responsibility, not defined by a relation
of inequality, but a free rational agent, whose participation
in medical research is not derived from a logic of responsi-
bility or care but of choice.
The shift toward a logic of choice is epitomized by the
prominence of “informed consent” as the ultimate mea-
sure of ethical medical research (Kuczewski and Marshall
2002). Fully informed, the rational individual is expected
to choose to volunteer in meaningful research, balancing
potential benefits and risks (see, e.g., Emanuel 2005). The
voluntariness of his or her choice relies on the absence of
“undue inducement,” that is, the offer of satisfying needs in
return for participation—money, food, or medicine.6 Vital
material needs, and thus material difference, should not be
part of research engagements.
Although “poverty” remains central to the lexicon of
global health research, poverty is here not construed as
a material, comparative relation but as a propensity that
makes an individual (or group) “vulnerable”—a related key
trope of bioethics discourse, referencing weakened auton-
omy. Material justice is here outside the remit of bioeth-
ically good research practice. Responding to the (relative)
poverty and need of a research participant, in this logic,
compromises the person’s autonomy and challenges the
morality of scientific work. In turn, bioethicists should,
according to a leading proponent, “ignore money”—and,
by extension, wider material differences—to focus on cen-
tral ethical concerns such as autonomy (Emanuel 2005:13).
The (fewer) ethicists for whom justice is central focus on
global funding and policy (e.g., Benatar 1998; Macklin 2008;
Meslin 2008). I am more concerned here with the ethics
of concrete engagements and the localized experience
of inequality arising from material confrontation in one
place.
While indifference tomaterial difference is inscribed in
the rules of working with research participants, the same
values of autonomy and voluntariness pertain to associa-
tions between scientists and institutional engagements, as
they are conceived in the logic of “collaboration” and “part-
nership.” The different parties are here described as inde-
pendent entities who engagewith each other out of free and
rational choice: This applies to African staff employed with
overseas funds on temporary, project-related contracts, and
it applies to the larger collaborative agreement between an
African national, parastatal institute and a North American
government institution (or any other Northern partner). All
partners choose to engage or not to engage independently,
and the relative inequalities between them, notably, differ-
ences in resources, do not entail responsibilities or entitle-
ments and should not affect good working relations.
Irrespective of actual material differences, the ethics
of research participation and scientific collaboration is
premised on equality in two important dimensions: legal
rights and information and communication. This tenet of
autonomy and equality makes collaborative science pro-
duction feasible (just as moralities of colonial domination
or the paternalism of aid did in previous regimes, premised
on acknowledged inequality). It allows one to work to-
gether with others and preserve dignity, stabilizing produc-
tive associations against the tensions and frictions that ma-
terial inequality would risk producing between scientists
and subjects, or among colleagues of different wealth and
18
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influence, and between their respective, differently re-
sourced institutions and nations.
Yet the exclusion of material difference from the or-
der of knowledge making cannot resolve the concrete prac-
tical problems that material difference raises: Making sci-
ence, and medical science at that, requires close mate-
rial engagements and cooperative social relations. In the
situated daily work of science, then, material differences
are seen and experienced—if often differently by different
protagonists.
This knowledge is often not explicit, not verbalized
and communicated or written or published, but intuitive,
habitual, and embodied in skills. And, as it is in poten-
tial conflict with the constitutional narrative of equality-in-
difference, such experiential knowing of inequality is often
unarticulated, sometimes silenced, excluded from public
conversation and official record, and restrained to partic-
ular situations—“unknown.”7 In the remainder of this ar-
ticle, I explore this movement between knowing and un-
knowing, drawing on observations around the CT trial and
the wider NCRO–GHA collaboration, examining diverse lo-
cations across the hierarchical space of the trial commu-
nity, and crossing the epistemological divide between re-
searchers and researched.
Contradictions (un)known
Hunger
Unknowing is most obvious around relations with study
volunteers, recruited from economically deprived groups
in the city, for whom material need—hunger and lack of
health care—is directly linked to survival, health, and well-
being. Especially in HIV treatment research, economic and
medical realities intersect, affecting intervention outcomes
and data validity, as nutrition affects drug effects and ad-
herence to therapeutic regimens. Despite the importance of
hunger to people’s health and the primacy of seeking suste-
nance in participants’ everyday life, hunger is little spoken
about in trial documents and procedures (except for studies
that have a specific digestion-related interest like drug ab-
sorption studies; see Kalofonos 2010; Prince 2012a, 2012b).
When participants were interviewed for our CT, their strug-
gle to procure food did not figure in the questionnaires
used during “nutritional counseling,” which individual par-
ticipants were given when attending study visits and when
presenting with signs of malnutrition or sickness. On these
occasions, the nutritionist weighed and measured the par-
ticipant and administered, first, a “food frequency form,”
which detailed how regularly each food item from a five-
page list, from maize to ice cream, cabbage to wines, was
consumed, and, then, a “24-hour recall diet form” of food
and drink consumed for three regular meals and up to four
intermediate snacks. While the questions, if correctly an-
swered, produced detailed data, there was some discrep-
ancy between the forms’ range of conceivable foods (some
relatively high cost) and those actually available and be-
tween the forms’ assumption that respondents consumed
regular meals and participants’ everyday realities of few
food options and skippedmeals. Yet the participants in data
collection encounters did not usually speak about this gap
(for related observations in HIV care, see Prince 2012a, in
press). (See Figure 2.)
We observed participants, while waiting for study pro-
cedures on the benches outside the clinic, speaking among
themselves about these realities of their lives; staff, mean-
while, talking among trusted colleagues, sometimes ex-
pressed sympathy with participants’ misery. Only occasion-
ally, “off the record,” in moments of personal conversation
not planned by study documents, did participants admit to
staff that they were hungry and tried to establish a relation
between their own needs and staff’s presumed resources
and responsibilities (not in the sense of legal liability but
as response abilities resulting from different resources).
Hunger and other material needs were more likely to rise to
the fore when staff met participants in their homes and es-
tablished relations beyond their engagement as researcher
and research subject–object (or research programemployee
and unemployed volunteer). This allowed for the articula-
tion of need, evoking local idioms of sharing rather than
making claims or begging, and for affective responses; and
staff commonly gave small amounts of their own money or
brought food or old clothes to participants who were obvi-
ously needy or had young children.
Such gestures suspended assumptions of autonomy
and equality, establishing relations of difference. More
patron–client relations than disinterested connections be-
tween independent agents, these relations were described
by CT staff and participants as “friendship” or referenced
through kinship terms—“My sister, I brought this for our
baby”—enacting local patterns of extended kin responsibil-
ity. Practices like private gifts were not foreseen by the writ-
ten standard operating procedures (SOPs) that operational-
ize trial practices, and they potentially infringed on regu-
latory rules. Staff therefore (and because their own money
was involved) perceived such donations as ambiguous and
did not report them in projectmeetings; in the words of one
of the scientists, “Even a bar of soap can be interpreted as
coercion by the ethics review.”
Participants’ deprivation, therefore, does not com-
monly feature in the public language of research, in con-
ference papers or publications.8 Instead, it is spoken about
in informal chat among staff as they sympathize with
participants and think about possibilities to assist or re-
flect on their inability to do so, due to their place in orga-
nizational hierarchies, to limited resources, and to infinite
needs. Local staff are especially familiar, from their own and
family experience, with participants’ economic conditions
and know that participants are hungry, but they cannot
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Figure 2. Encounters at the research clinic in Africa. Original painting/drawing by research staff member J. A. Ondiek. Courtesy of the artist.
include this knowledge in their survey forms or systemati-
cally act on it.
The only written records of such experiences are the
practical documents shared among staff to coordinate
work, which are not distributed more widely. In the CT, the
minutes of weekly fieldwork planning meetings thus de-
tailed individual cases’ “social issues”: Confronting poverty
and hunger, staff provided “counseling” and “encourage-
ment”; in cases of medical malnutrition, measurable as
weight indexes or blood values, they sometimes prescribed
pharmaceutical nutritional supplements for a given period;
and, occasionally, one-off support, such as advising a par-
ticipant to seek support at anNGO’s nutritional project, was
noted in the minutes.
More concrete entries on social conditions were found
in field staff’s personal notebooks, used in their daily work
to remember details about participants that have a bearing
on subsequent visits. In the CT, these notes were collected
in an “encounters log” on preprinted, hand-filled sheets,
through which field staff communicated with each other
about practical concerns. Here, participants’ lives were jot-
ted down in handwriting: depleted food stores and skipped
meals, hungry or sick children, marginal incomes, leak-
ing roofs and unpaid rents, participants’ fears of disclos-
ing their HIV status, and hostile husbands. Observations
ranged from mundane—“participant is fine; raised a con-
cern of not having a watch so she is not consistent on
[drug taking] time” and “had social problems with hus-
band, which is resolved now”—to more medical—“she is
malnourished, BMI 18.1; HB 8.5; commenced on Saferon
capsules and folic acid”; from emotional and moving—
“participant complained of dizziness; had so many is-
sues e.g. lack of food, financial support and kind of re-
jection . . . needs serious support/counseling” and “par-
ticipant was emotional, tears running down her cheeks,
threatening to commit suicide”—tomoments when profes-
sionalism could not hide profound personal experiences—
“participant found dead early this morning . . . SAE and
change of status filled, and verbal autopsy.”
This log was continuously updated and consulted; field
staff checked it before setting off, or when phoning from
the field to obtain details about a participant they could
not find or did not know how to approach, or to update the
document. Yet this knowledge did not constitute “data”—
the term that heremarks the limit of recognized knowledge.
Its exclusion as data was not intended to hide hunger and
poverty; rather, such knowledge is not deemed crucial for
the scientific and ethical quality of research. Participants’
chronic hunger was thus dissociated from the knowledge
practices of research and from the resources and respon-
sibility of those involved in it. At the same time, knowledge
about poverty, hunger, and other material conditions was
obviously essential for the functioning of the CT: had staff
not known which of the volunteers had particular needs—
who could not feed a child before giving drugs, who had no
permanent home, no family support—and if they had not
shared such information, they would not have been able
to find the participants during their restless peregrinations
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in search of sustenance and could not have supported par-
ticipants’ adherence tomedication and clinical procedures.
Neither would they have known where to look for poten-
tial participants without a clear idea of the city’s and re-
gion’s economic geography or been able to convince peo-
ple to join and stay in a trial. The unknown knowledge was
vital to maintaining relations, without which research
would be impossible, and yet it could not be spoken, lest
it raise regulatory concerns and potential disciplinary ac-
tion, rupturing the collaborative texture and possibly caus-
ing moral unease. It had to remain in the known unknown
space of daily engagements to do its work.
If one asks staff and scientists involved in these situa-
tions why hunger is not discussed more prominently, one
hears several valid responses, the most important being
that hunger is a background reality, outside the remit of
research—amatter of development aid programs and not of
scientific institutions: “That’s not our mandate.” One can-
not fund measures against hunger through a clinical trial
budget, except for certain individuals under strictly defined
circumstances. For instance, when it presents as acute, clin-
ical malnutrition—a medical “adverse event”—hunger can
be treated with supplements or fortified foods, but only un-
til the patient has regained weight or lab values have been
restored. Or it can be addressed when diet directly affects
a trial intervention, such as in drug absorption studies, in
which intake of a modicum of food must be ascertained.
Yet, in either of these cases, the food supplied is strictly
for the individual patient’s use, which ignores the shared
nature of food supplies and commensality and the hunger
of children or siblings. Underlying the nonknowledges and
silences around hunger and other effects of material in-
equality, beyond such matters of mandate and funding, is a
comprehensive sense of impotence among medical practi-
tioners, the recognition of one’s inability to respond effec-
tively to the expanding societal and medical crisis and to
alleviate the conditions of survival in which public health
research in Africa is situated.
While vital inequalities are not much spoken or writ-
ten about in public, professional engagements, they are
keenly observed and spoken about, at times passionately,
in private situations, outside the research setting, and in ho-
mogeneous groups within which people identify with each
other, such as among the female field staff or between these
women and female CT participants in their homes. Thus,
although they do not become part of the scientific text or
of public debate—and are thereby removed from politi-
cal contestation—they do shape, in private discussions and
through silences as well as in concrete mundane practices,
engagements within the trial community, contributing to
the successful production of scientific research.
Unrelated to study procedures and often driven by per-
sonal moral commitment, staff often provide lunch to par-
ticipants during long study visits or extend other similar oc-
casional hospitality. This is appreciated by participants as a
gesture of goodwill and care but not perceived—at least by
trial managers—as an integral part of the trial itself. Simi-
larly, outside the trial, GHA scientists at times use their in-
stitutional proximity to nonresearch aid programs to ensure
some nutritional support for needy participant groups. To
go beyond such valuable ad hocmeasures and, for instance,
propose a systematic nutritional program not only would
exceed the research mandate and budget and mean taking
on a responsibility beyond the collaboration’s capacity but
also would create dependencies and hierarchical relations
of care (and inequalities among recipients), contrary to the
idea of equality and independence that underlies voluntary
trial participation.
Medicines
A similar exclusion of thematerialities of survival fromwhat
is known pertains to participants’ health care needs. For the
duration of the trial (usually a few years), research projects
like theCTprovide free consultationswith gooddoctors and
cover the costs of private hospital admission, drugs, and di-
agnostics, offering a quality of care that otherwise is un-
available in the region. This care excludes chronic condi-
tions and referral beyond the local hospital (unless illness
is directly and unambiguously caused by the trial interven-
tion), and it probably falls short of the kind of health care
that privately insured research staff and their expatriate col-
leagues are entitled to. But it constitutes an enormous im-
provement over public facilities’ poor and costly services,
which participants usually have to rely on, and which they
often are recruited from and referred back to after a trial.9
This is particularly the case for HIV-positive research par-
ticipants, who, as part of trials, receive intensive, person-
alized treatment follow-up and free care for opportunistic
infections. Trial resources thus enable survival for partici-
pants and their offspring, and participants sometimes de-
scribe clinical trials or the GHA–NCRO clinic as a “health
care system.”10
Some dimensions of trial-related health care are de-
fined in research protocols and budgets—increasingly
clearly in recent years and, in particular, when health
care responds to requirements of the trial. For example
“passive surveillance” of diseases, an outcome measure in
some studies, makes it necessary to invite participants for
paid-for visits to the hospital for all outpatient care. Simi-
larly, care for trial-related “adverse events”—vital for GCP
standard evaluations of new drugs—may require paid-for
inpatient admissions; some protocols include “emergency
care” as a Hippocratic obligation, whereas others explicitly
exclude accident and trauma admissions unrelated to the
trial intervention.
Yet the broader contribution of clinical trials to the
health of participants and communities can only partially
be anticipated by trial documents, andprotocols commonly
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describe care beyond trial procedures “on a case-by-case
basis” (although in recent years, health benefits are some-
times more clearly defined in research protocols stipulat-
ing specific monetary amounts for inpatient and outpa-
tient care per participant). This openness regarding health
care benefits may partly be due to the silencing effect of
ethics prohibitions against “inducement”—quality health
care alone is an important incentive for potential study par-
ticipants (e.g., Fairhead et al. 2006; Geissler et al. 2008).
But, above all, it reflects the complexity of real-life health
care, which requiresmedical doctors’ clinical judgment and
triage (since even well-funded trials cannot cover all health
care needs in their purview); in response, the health bene-
fits, unlike clinical trial procedures or laboratorywork,must
often bemodified in the process of research rather than be-
ing “set in stone” in SOPs (see also Geissler et al. 2008). Any
a priori attempt to explicate the rules of trial care would in-
evitably be defined by its limitations and thereby draw at-
tention to the persistence of unequal suffering (reawaken-
ing the genies of the 1997 standards-of-care debate; see N.
12).
Unknowing around health care applies also to the poor
standards of care and lack of medicines in government
health facilities as compared to the research clinic’s near-
global standards. These shortcomings are well known to re-
searchers, especially local medical staff, trained in and re-
cruited from government facilities. Despite this, research
projects usually describe their own medical care as a mere
complement to allegedly existent public services, which are
assumed to take over when a trial, because of its mandate,
budget, or limited duration, cannot extend care (most ob-
viously in the posttrial referral of participants). In official
research documents, discrepancies between trial care and
public care in the government facilities (or between offi-
cial policies and real care provision in such facilities) are of-
ten not detailed. The language of collaborative partnership,
compounded by the fictions of official government policy
and those of the global development partners, insists that
these different medical institutions and the clinical prac-
titioners inhabiting them engage as equals. To mention or
put in writing that one party is less able or willing than the
other to achieve its medical aims would break the collabo-
rative consensus.11
However, differences are known in other ways: During
trials like the CT, volunteers are referred for inpatient treat-
ment to the government hospital; even if they are treated
on the better-resourced “amenity” ward that incurs higher
fees, the clinical observations generated during their stays
(essential for data continuity) are often not up to the stan-
dards required by the trial protocol, not least because actual
hospital procedures often fall short of regulative guidelines;
thus, vital measurements such as temperature and cardiac
and respiratory rates are not collected when they should be,
or, as was repeatedly noted in the CT encounters log, “par-
ticipant’s charts cannot be found” in the hospital. To rem-
edy this problem—an issue of data validity as well as patient
care—dedicated and well-trained NCRO–GHA nursing staff
and clinicians closely monitor “their” patients.
Having previously worked in government clinics, they
possess informal knowledge of local medical institutions
and know where and how to intervene, causing as little
friction as possible (because, formally, patients in govern-
ment hospital care are under the authority of government
clinicians): checking patient charts and alerting nurses to
amend them, ensuring food and feeding implements are
available on time, carrying nutritional supplements dis-
tributed at the government hospital from there to the pri-
vate clinic or special equipment from the private to the pub-
lic hospital, making small payments for diagnostic proce-
dures and supplementing pharmaceuticals that are tem-
porarily out of stock in the hospital pharmacy, and guid-
ing patients through hospital procedures such as X-ray and
payments, which they know are unclear and riddled with
officialdom. Their familiarity with the setting, and the ex-
periential knowledge arising from their research work, is re-
flected, again, in notes in the log such as, “participant had
a problem at discharge when invoice went missing from
her file. It is suspected it was used to sneak out another
patient. Hospital administration said they would investi-
gate the matter. The mother was eventually released.” And
it is because of the staff’s informal familiarity with health
care differences that some proceduresmay be conducted in
more expensive private hospitals that are better equipped
and staffed. Moreover, patients may be moved to such hos-
pitals temporarily to receive better care, for example, be-
cause staff in the government hospital did not consider it
necessary to admit a participant referred to them by GHA
staff or because the government hospital ran out of intra-
venous fluids or certain drugs.12
This knowledge—much of it acquired while working in
theCT itself, by tracing researchparticipants throughpublic
hospital care—helps staff bridge the multiple gaps between
the transnational standards of their protocol and the reali-
ties of the government hospital, ensuring valid trial data and
ascertaining a modicum of care for their patients, enhanc-
ing patients’ chances of clinical success.
Yet this detailed knowledge of public health facilities
also reveals the acute problem of referring study volunteers
back to these facilities after the end of a trial or if they
suffer from chronic ailments (e.g., cardiac problems,
asthma, or cancer) or injuries and trauma that exceed
a trial’s time span or budget. If it were a recognized
fact that government hospitals do not, or do not reliably,
provide the services necessary for patient survival, and if
this knowledge were written into research documents or
publicly debatedwithin trials, the final referral of volunteers
“for further care” to these government hospitals would re-
quire more careful consideration.13 While some lead scien-
tific staff admit to “not knowing” exactly which treatments
relevant to ex–trial participants are available in the public
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hospital—and given the almost daily changes of such con-
ditions, this is not easy to know—no initiative is taken to
systematically acquire this knowledge, and the experiences
that are gathered by staff working across the institutional
divide are buried in their notes—“anecdotal evidence” but
not “data.”14
Doubts about posttrial referral are left implicit and are
partially responded to through ad hoc support for individ-
ual patients. The CT’s doctors were occasionally consulted
by participants after their “exit” from the trial and always
seemed willing to advise or even examine these patients,
whose personal doctors they had practically been for years,
or to assist by contacting their new care providers. This care
relies on personal clinical commitment and infringes—like
personal gifts in response to hunger—on regulations speci-
fying that interaction with trial participants must end after
their “exit” from a study, even if the doctors do not draw on
diagnostic or pharmaceutical resources of the trial. Thus,
these engagements remain undocumented; again, crucial
knowledge about the materialities of survival remains si-
multaneously known and yet unknowable, unspoken of, at
the heart of a medical research endeavor, although without
this experiential knowledge, clinicians and nurses would
have been unable to collect valid data and ensure adequate
care.
Among diverse explanations for this unknowing are,
apart from the wish to avoid alterations or infringements
of the approved protocol and complications with regulators
and funders, the diplomatic avoidance of confrontations
with the Ministry of Health and with colleagues working
within public hospitals, whom one respects and on whom
one relies for access to participants and research settings.
Just as in the case of hunger, the unknowing of intimate
knowledge of difference in the official script of the clin-
ical trial facilitates collaborations with government clini-
cians and the Ministry of Health, and both unknowing and
knowledge are critical to the practical conduct of everyday
research practices.
Money
The same strictures apply to small monetary payments that
accompany and facilitate participant recruitment. These
so-called transport reimbursements range from £3 to £5
($4–7) per clinic visit, exceeding actual transport costs
by 30–100 percent. They are equivalent to a day’s wage
in an economy with scarce labor opportunities, where
many participants do not know in the morning what will
be available to eat in the evening. Such transport re-
imbursements form part of a wider economy attendant
to clinical trials and research programs, which also pro-
vides opportunities for monetary income through involve-
ment as “peer-educators,” “recruiters,” and other “volun-
teers,” who are compensated for transport but not paid for
labor.
In trial documents and dialogues, these vital transfers
are never referred to as net “payments” but are persistently
called “transport allowance,” covering participants’ alleged
expenses to make participation cost free. Mentioning “pay-
ment” in study documents can cause regulatory problems
and delay ethics approval, as the assumed voluntariness of
participation, and subjects’ independence, would be com-
promised by transfers of value.15 Thus, in the CT, a trial
form asking participants for “potential concerns” arising
from the informed consent process explicitly asked, “Why
do we reimburse fare? (Explore for the possibility of confu-
sion of fare reimbursement with payment.)” There is thus
a gap between participants’ experience of transport reim-
bursements as a net gain and their description in the pub-
lic discourses of research as zero-sum transactions. (See
Figure 3.)
Everybody concerned—participants and staff—is
aware of this “misunderstanding” and yet agrees to main-
tain it. If one asks scientific staff how much they “pay”
volunteers, the answer is “we don’t pay,” sometimes ac-
companied by an ironic or wry smile. The opening between
terminological rigor and laughter maintains the oscillation
between known and unknown; the mirth might also reveal
a certain pleasure the speaker takes in the ability to define
knowledge and to unknow.
The unknowing of the material realities of monetary
transfers is achieved not only by excluding them from writ-
ten documents and public discourse but also by the use of
alternative idioms: reimbursement instead of payment or
gift. Like hunger and medical neglect, marginal incomes
are not part of the knowledge that the research program
generates or explicitly recognizes. As in the previous ex-
amples, this unknowing must remain incomplete because
the unknown known is important to maintain productive
trial relationships: To mobilize prospective participants,
“reimbursement rates” must be made known in the “com-
munity” (following ethics guidelines, they are often even
stipulated on participant information sheets). To offer
competitive rates, scientists must know their value in a
local economy and how much other research projects
offer, and sometimes rates of transport reimbursement are
negotiated between different trials competing for partici-
pants. In turn, experienced participants, aiming for higher
“reimbursement,” know how to justify claims with “raised
fares,” “fuel prices,” or “increased distances” (rather than
living expenses orminimumsalaries). This agreement helps
to avoid openly renouncing the fundamental value of au-
tonomous choice. Were the nature of these value transfers
to bemade knownas incentive payment or gift, for example,
in protocols submitted for ethical approval, this might in-
vite institutional review board criticism for “undue induce-
ment.” Yet, if, in response to such critique, no money at all
were given to participants, it would decrease participant re-
cruitment and retention. Either way, making the unknown
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Figure 3. Medical research fieldwork in an African city. Original drawing by research staff member J. A. Ondiek. Courtesy of the artist.
known would throw a wrench in the workings of the trial.
(See Figure 4.)
Relations among researchers
Nonknowledge of inequality is particularly striking with re-
gard to poor study participants. Yet the practice of mak-
ing material differences unknown applies also to relations
among research staff, between local and foreign scien-
tists, and between institutions. These actors are not directly
threatened by sickness and death, but the conditions of
“mere survival” among the poorest also affect life in the
precarious new “middle” or, as they locally are referred to,
“working” classes—as an omnipresent threat, and through
extensive kinship responsibilities. Yet, although no less ob-
vious than inequalities between research workers and par-
ticipants,material differences among research staff working
in scientific collaborations are rarely articulated.16
Income differences between staff are reflected in ob-
servable everyday inequalities concerning housing, cars, se-
curity and evacuation schemes, health insurance, and chil-
dren’s schooling—that is, much as they do in the relations
with study participants, they touch on obvious inequalities
in the conditions of life, not always in the sense of physi-
cal survival but in terms of pursuing dreams and projects
and assuring one’s children’s futures. At the workplace, dif-
ferences are associated with managerial rank, access to in-
formation and resources, and decision-making power, in
which those staff who are employed on “international” con-
tracts often act as research leaders and principal investiga-
tors (PIs; the latter issue being targeted by funding agencies’
calls for “capacity building” and institutional policies in fa-
vor of African PIs). But, despite their obviousness, they are
not generally spoken about in professional engagements,
although they might shape personal relationships and at-
titudes in everyday collaboration.
Many concrete everyday life concerns are not known,
or are only partially known, between different groups—
an expatriate scientist is unlikely to know much about
the intricacies involved in local colleagues’ business ac-
tivities, agricultural investments, or building projects, cru-
cial for long-term security but sometimes interfering with
other commitments; and a local scientist, in turn, has lit-
tle idea about tax-free mail-order services and the origins
of the North American colleagues’ muesli bars or the same
colleagues’ mortgage payments and educational saving
needs. This may well be because such issues are private, or
irrelevant to the other group, but, as undiscussed observa-
tions, these facts feed into mutual perceptions.
Indirectly, these differences figure in casual conversa-
tions among social peers (rather than in groups involv-
ing hierarchical or institutional differences). Although the
inequalities are about class and employment rather than
geographical origins, they are often informally discussed
among local staff by contrasting national citizens and expa-
triates (or employment category acronyms that distinguish,
among others, North American officers, other citizens on
North American contracts, locals on short-term contracts,
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Figure 4. Fieldworker in an African village homestead. Original drawing by research staff member J. A. Ondiek. Courtesy of the artist.
and locals on national government permanent contacts).17
In this context, everyday conversations about “colonialism”
among local staff at times substitute open debates about
contemporary inequalities and index the sensitivity of these
relations, as colonial has negative connotations for every-
one involved in this collaboration. Thus, a lunchtime dis-
cussion about Christian and traditional practices, a pro-
pos participants’ (pharmacologically problematic) herbal
self-medication, provokes some young men to declare
themselves “traditionalist” and “pagan” and to denounce
missionization as integral to colonial domination. A conver-
sation after work aboutmale circumcision, the newweapon
against AIDS promoted by GHA, among others, calls forth,
half jokingly, hard-line ethnic positions against this sup-
posed assault on “our culture,” which here is rendered as
part of a long history of colonial antitraditionalism.
Expatriate staff, especially if not from a former coloniz-
ing nation, generally see their endeavor as a rupture from
the colonial tradition. Rather than tracing colonialism’s his-
torical extensions, they respond with understandable in-
dignation to the term. This applies to progressive scien-
tists, who considered their national history as untouched
by African colonial history, but also to the expatriate ad-
ministrative staff, who cited NCRO’s permanent, pension-
able employment contracts as an example of the “colonial
legacy” that the collaboration had thankfully liberated itself
from.
Because of short-term postings in Africa, mundane
practical continuities, such as where one lives, shops, or
goes to school, are not charged with particular significance
by most expatriate visitors. By contrast, such material reali-
ties and historical continuities are not lost on local staff, and
comments about “them and us” and material differences
between the two are common in informal conversations
among peers. Thus, when I set off to drive home after one
of our first days at an urban research clinic and offered a lift
to two junior staff members with whom I had spent the day,
they responded, “You are heading that side [pointing to-
ward what in colonial times was designated a “white” area],
we are heading there, towards the ghetto [pointing in the
opposite direction toward the colonial “African” and post-
colonial informal areas of town].”18 This moment of speak-
ing inequality at the end of a shared workweek, and outside
the work setting, opened the way for further conversations.
It is indicative not only of the unknowing of inequalities but
also of the importance of making inequality explicit in pri-
vate, duringmoments of conviviality or in socially homoge-
neous settings.
The episode also points to anthropologists’ ambigu-
ous role as far as inequality and its unknowing are con-
cerned. The practice of participant-observation, dear to our
discipline, remains, if not a fiction, a struggle under con-
ditions of extreme economic inequality, and itself involves
unknowing. A. L. Epstein’s (1981:9–10) description of urban
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ethnography under conditions of late colonial racial segre-
gation acknowledges the near impossibility of participat-
ing in the spaces of the urban poor or obtaining an “in-
sider” perspective (Epstein finding, ahead of his discipline,
remedy in his own movements between unequal fields).
My own fieldwork was, like that of any urban Africanist
ethnographer, riddled by similar spatial effects of class.
Maybe cities constitute a particularly problematic situation
in that regard, but one might equally argue that the city
makes for more straightforward anthropological engage-
ment with factual inequality since unknowing—as the story
above illustrates—is easily unveiled there. By contrast, an
earlier constellation in which I was involved over several
years, in the quintessential villagemud hut, could, likemost
classic Africanist ethnography, be described as relying on
a localized fiction of equality, a known unknown (Geissler
and Prince 2010). Ours was a carefully calibrated balance
of knowledge, which was broken whenever we ventured be-
yond familiar environs or met strangers who, ignorant of
this established narration, honestly if bluntly asked for a
share in our wealth. The unknowing involved in individ-
ual ethnographic work—intertwined with manifold every-
day relational practices and deriving from extended shared
presence—is different from unknowing as part of a large in-
stitutional structure, but there can be no doubt that the un-
knowing of inequality, and its effects on knowledge mak-
ing, would also be a fruitful subject for (maybe especially
Africanist) anthropological reflection.
In the NCRO–GHA context, speech about categorical
inequalities rarely traversed the boundary of the unequal
groups, as in the exchange above. Drinking and other pri-
vate convivial moments marked by joking and banter and
the intimacy of friendship created situations when inequal-
ity in professional collaboration could be raised. These
moments were the equivalent of the situations of intimate,
domestic relatedness that occurred between staff and par-
ticipants, which, asmentioned above, allowed for conversa-
tions about hunger and acknowledged the equality of needs
in contrast to differential access. Here, one could at times
hear critical comments, sometimes concerning inequalities
between those present, more commonly about those af-
fecting others who were not. Income differences were then
raised to justify unequal buying of drinks rounds or to ne-
gotiate openly about how to split a large bill in reflection of
these realities. However, even on those occasions, frankness
was an exception. More characteristic was awkwardness, as
when a waiter handed the bill to a senior expatriate among
the drinkers, common in locations frequented by expatri-
ates, less so in the old civil servants’ clubs predominantly
patronized by African officials: the irritation of local staff
that the waiter took unspoken differences for granted; the
embarrassment of the one who received the bill about this
unwelcome rupture of a moment of communion across in-
equality.
That inequalities are not made explicit by those who
have less is understandable; having less power and fewer re-
sources is embarrassing in a competitive contextmarked by
economic pretense, and it is risky to talk about because the
idiom of collaborative partnership requires one to perform
equality: Speaking out would be to expose one’s weakness
and to accuse one’s (more powerful) interlocutor of speak-
ing untruth about inequality and, thus, to rupture the agree-
ment that sustains one’s existence. But inequalities are not
discussed more commonly by those in a superior position,
such as senior and expatriate staff. One reason for this is po-
liteness and “diplomatic” adherence to the unwritten code
of collaborative partnership—to avoid laying bare contra-
dictions between the egalitarian values that support one’s
personal and professional commitments and material re-
alities. Underlying this is, as suggested above, a sense of
impotency, which makes it seem futile to address issues—
however personally uncomfortable one might find them—
that one thinks one cannot do anything about.
Inequalities among research staff do not figure in pub-
lic speech and scientific writings, because such explica-
tion would—just like drawing attention to participants’ vi-
tal needs and researchers’ resources—infringe the postulate
of “equality-in-difference” (as opposed to the recognition of
unequal conditions and same human needs): Persons are
(legally) equal but belong to different places and economic
(and medical) orders, limiting the possibility of compari-
son. For local scientific workers, the difference between ex-
patriate staff and themselves is tangible, historically rooted,
within the shared space of the city: hence, the quip about
the “ghetto” above. For short-term “expatriate” staff likemy-
self, by contrast, the situation is less obvious: I am not com-
pelled to compare my relative wealth with that of my local
colleague, because on some level I do not consider myself
part of the city, nor do I necessarily experience the city as a
shared polity (unlike my colonial predecessors might have
done); instead, I measure myself by the living standards of
my “real” home, say, a middle-class neighborhood in a dis-
tant European city, where I pay off my mortgage. Thanks
to this fiction, I can stick to the idea of scientific collabora-
tion as a link between different equals and between distant
places—rather than situating it within a shared, contested,
social space. The segmentation within the city, and in the
trial community, is framed within larger, “global,” geogra-
phies, which, on account of their scale, are perceived as be-
yond the reach of powerless scientists.
The institutionalized aversion to articulations of in-
equality and diversity of interests is underscored by conno-
tations of the word politics or political. Referring to some-
thing in this context as “political” implies that it is “tricky
or dangerous,” charged with power issues, and, thus, best
handled diplomatically by seniors; in the context of meet-
ings, it might imply that it is best discussed in a smaller
circle. By contrast, an individual or group among the local
26
Public secrets in public health  American Ethnologist
community or among staff that is deemed “political” may
be seen as “troublesome.”19 Although the collaboration’s se-
nior staff, in principle, wishes for open debate and encour-
ages junior staff and community members to “speak out,”
this rendering of politics suggests that the conflicts of in-
terest that inevitably arise from material inequalities are
not necessarily considered a legitimate object of political
contestation.
Not speaking about obvious inequalities between re-
searchers of different origin is a way of unknowing them.
This silence is accompanied, just as in the examples per-
taining to research participants, by peculiar ways of speak-
ing. The equivalent of “transport reimbursement” as a
seemingly valueless transfer of value is here the “per diem”
allotted, for example, to research staff for travel out of the
station or to international conferences (see, e.g., Jordan
Smith 2003; Ridde 2010).20 The designation of daily pay-
ments from the GHA to individual staff as “per diem” sug-
gests that these allowances are equivalent to the costs of
bodily sustenance for a day. However, for many lesser-paid
local research workers, these are vital salary components—
with per diems exceeding actual salaries. While their se-
nior colleagues stay and eat in international conference ho-
tels, local junior staff compete among themselves over who
savesmost of the per diemby stayingwith relatives or in less
expensive accommodations and eating and drinking out-
side the conference venue. The tangible inequality in the
daily life of these two kinds of conference participants—
and, presumably, in their conference experience—appears
here as “choice,” because, receiving a per diem, the local
staff could choose to eat and drink in the international con-
ference hotel (the same “voluntariness” as implied by the
notion of “transport reimbursement”). Wider inequalities
and dependencies are thereby silenced for the duration of
the conference.
The conference situation also illustrates the diversity
and degrees of (non)knowledge in this order: An expatri-
ate Ph.D. student whose grant pays for the conference ho-
tel feels uncomfortable that local colleagues with whom he
works and socializes “in the field” stay far from the hotel
and spend their evenings in different venues; a visiting ex-
patriate donor representative, by contrast, sees nothing of
this and makes, on the contrary, a favorable comment on
the large proportion of African participants in attendance
at the meeting; a resident expatriate might know who stays
where but takes it for granted, focusing on themeeting’s sci-
entific content; likewise, local staff members see no reason
to question the situation and are satisfied with the addi-
tional income at the time of annual school fee payments;
the only sarcastic remark about these differences, uttered
in a poolside conversation with the foreign Ph.D. student,
comes from a very senior African scientist and university
professor, who has been in this trade for a long time and
has nothing to lose from an occasional joke about its bla-
tant contradictions.
Performing equality
These ways of unknowing inequalities are complemented
by performances that make equality visible, conjur-
ing up the vision of partnership. In scientific confer-
ences, researchers participate on equal terms. Seating
arrangements, conference meals, access to presentation
technology and refreshments create a situation of scien-
tific equality, notwithstanding the different personal cir-
cumstances. The design of PowerPoint slides and styles of
presentation are carefully rehearsed, and the many names
of scientific authors on the program present a mixture of
local and expatriate scientists, displaying collegiality. Dur-
ing breaks, participants mingle over free pastries around
the pool, and little in dress or comportment would suggest
significant inequalities. While this performance of science
as level playing field certainly conceals differentiations—
encoded in long and carefully weighed (and interpreted)
authorship lists on the papers or in decisions about who
presents which finding when and where—it is important to
recognize howmuch this situation, nevertheless, is appreci-
ated, especially by African scientists: For the older ones, the
contrast to formal and informal segregations inherited from
colonialism is a personal achievement, and, for younger
ones, the appearance of equality on the conference stage
holds up a promise for their global professional future.
Evenmore explicitly performing equality are employer-
sponsored parties and team-building exercises that large-
scale research programs commonly arrange. Staff parties in
relation to successful projects, retreats to luxurious tourist
destinations, sporting competitions to call forth the spirit
of unity or to celebrate global health days, and events
with specially hired team-building consultants organizing
games and catering have the explicit purpose of making
all employees feel like they are part of the larger collabo-
rative whole and of bringing about togetherness and part-
nership across difference. Inequality is, on such occasions,
made invisible, notably by the “equal” terms of sports. Phys-
ical proximity and shared bodily activities, albeit open to
varying cultural interpretations, are meant to produce the
experience of equal rights and shared purpose.
These performances of equality are often accompanied
by somemuttering about the inequalities, about the alleged
stinginess of the organizers, about the choice of an expatri-
ate caterer rather than a local women’s group, and so on, by
thosewho feel less equal than others in the trial community.
Irony, “seeing through” realities and intentions behind such
exercises, and self-conscious laughter while participating in
them are common features of such events and not limited
to any particular group; at the same time, people enjoy the
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opportunity to have fun together. Only few senior local sci-
entists may abstain from these events, sometimes deploy-
ing their absence as deliberate critical statement (not al-
ways noticed by the addressees), emphasizing differences
contrary to the aimed-for inclusiveness. Yet, despite their
seeming triviality, such enactments of equality are more
than just make-believe. While a day of group games cannot
undo experiences of inequality, shared time, sports, eating,
drink, and laughter—including ironic laughter over the ob-
viousness of the exercise—have effects.
The alternating and contradictory layers of
experience—known, unknown, and known again—are
exemplified by a politically particularly conscious NCRO
colleague who showed me with pride as well as irony
his new screensavers, which depicted him with famous
international researchers in luxurious venues on the oc-
casion of international conferences around the globe.
While he “saw through” the veneer of equality that such
events conjure up, he did experience close social relations,
scholarly exchanges, and the fun and privilege of exploring
new countries and unfamiliar places. The same ambiguity
applies to less centrally organized kinds of team-building
exercises, such as scientists sharing meals and drinks
during work, throwing private parties, or engaging in joint
weekend expeditions on a low budget, adjusted both to
those on a relatively low salary and to those who prefer
simpler, more “human” or more “real” experiences.
End
This article originated, like many an anthropological text,
from an awkwardness during fieldwork: the feeling one has
when talking to someone who, one is sure, knows that what
is spoken is at odds with what can be seen. An uneasy sit-
uation that is hard to rupture, because that would entail
admitting to speaking the untruth and, worse still, accus-
ing the interlocutor of doing the same. Yet this situation is
not about “lying,” which entails that one party knows while
the other does not; neither is it appropriately captured by a
term like ideology, which, again, entails that some of those
concerned do not know the true nature of reality. It is nei-
ther false consciousness nor conscious falseness. Both of
these interpretations are based on the idea that knowledge
and theworld are or are not in a relation of correspondence.
This is not at issue if everyone, as if following a tacit agree-
ment, speaks as if they do not know what they know, do not
see what they see. An odd situation, especially if one finds it
among scientists.
Working in Africa with public health researchers—
sharing goals, respecting science, enjoying company—Iwas
time and again struck by our faculty to unknow our daily
confrontationwith inequality. As noted above, this unknow-
ing is a concern for all metropolitan knowledge production
in postcolonial settings (or across class divisions), including
ethnography. For the context studied in this article, public
health science in Africa, which is both motivated and en-
abled by vital inequalities, the question arises, what does
this unknowing do for, and to, science work?
“Unknown knowns” perform double work: They main-
tain consensus over the ontological premises and princi-
pal values that underlie research collaboration—such as
autonomy—and thus sustain working relations and proce-
dures. At the same time, what is unknown and yet known
provides flexible, malleable operational guidance, without
which the research would be impossible: Were the field-
worker to acknowledge the volunteer’s hunger, the research
nurse to respond to working conditions in public hospitals,
or the junior staffmember to be aware of resources and pos-
sibilities provided by transnational collaborations—and if
all of them at the same time were to disregard the dividing
line between what can be known for fact and what knowl-
edge should remain less definite—then their collaborative
effort at revealing new knowledge about disease and health
would be disturbed. Unknowing has a constructive place
in contemporary arrangements of scientific knowledge pro-
duction in Africa.
The consensus and stability established by this public
fiction, then, allows for private efforts by thosewhoproduce
science to try doing good according to their own morality,
within the limitations of what is and what can be known:
applying for additional funds that can be used to renovate
a building, which also benefits the public hospital (albeit
without stipulating this motive on the grant application),
or trying to ensure staff contract extensions and training;
setting up a corporate responsibility program or providing
free water supplies to one’s neighbors; examining and treat-
ing patients outside one’s protocol, using program trans-
port to refer a nontrial patient for treatment, or person-
ally caring for participants after the end of a trial; setting
up charity events or paying school fees. Going beyond what
they are obliged, or even permitted, to do within budgetary
and legislative constraints (and health system dysfunction),
these actors provide help in a pragmatic, tentative man-
ner and, sometimes, slowly extend possibilities within the
lasting boundaries that separate research work from every-
day human engagements and public, formal responsibili-
ties from private commitments. Maybe, then, silences and
evasions provide as stable a ground for effective social rela-
tions and actions as “hard facts”?
Yet unknowing has also less desirable effects. It affects
the workings of social relations within the trial community:
Issues that are unknownare harder to negotiate among con-
cerned parties. This can prevent factual improvements—
of care, pay levels, work practices, and lives. Moreover,
in the absence of open debate, speculation about par-
tially known disparities can translate into concealed mis-
givings and animosities, which can disturb research work
or collaboration, through negative public attitudes or covert
obstruction, or affect work morale and data validity. Unar-
ticulated tensions can be converted into rumors of occult
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activity and accusations (see, e.g., Leach and Fairhead 2006)
or may seek an outlet through labor tribunals and legal
proceedings (for a case unrelated to the NCRO–GHA collab-
oration, see Nordling 2012 andDaily Nation 2011:10). Thus,
in some situations here, differences and contradictions that
(for diverse reasons) are unknown should simply be made
known for the benefit of political articulation and contesta-
tion.21 This is, then, a task for doctors, scientists, and partic-
ipants inmedical research—guided by progressive ethicists,
activists, or journalists.
For the anthropologist, the question remains what this
collusion to unknow does to science and scientists. Partak-
ing in this public secret, I suspect, affects individualmotiva-
tion and direction of those who spend their lives in public
health research, blocking the opening, the distant horizon
of action, that the confrontation with injustice evokes. An
unflinching gaze at the scandalon of unsatisfied vital needs,
in the sense of what philosophers discuss as an “ethical im-
pulse,” can provide orientation for action, even though—or
precisely because—the discrepancy between the observed
need and one’s own abilities, and between one’s own and
the other’s resources, remains.22 By contrast, the exclusion
of this gap between is and ought from public text and from
spoken acknowledgment depletes motivation and affects
orientation on an individual level. The limited vista of the
presently doable curtails one’s view, imagination, orienta-
tion, and impetus. At best, injustice features then as some-
thing beyond this prospect-in-lieu-of horizon, as “not our
mandate,” or “mixing politics and science,” or plain fatal-
ist “unchangeability” (the negative connotation of politics,
above, is a case in point).
Individual effects accumulate, then, to shape a partic-
ular contemporary organization, economics, and, impor-
tantly, temporality of “global health” science, which the
historical anthropologist Guillaume Lachenal, in a recent
critique of speculative hypes in “global health,” pointedly
designates as “nihilist” (in press). The expectations of ever-
new technological fixes for human suffering, powered by
global charity and public–private partners that dominate
contemporary “global health” conceal, for Lachenal, a sense
of standstill beneath the hyperprogressive rhetoric—more
andmore of the same, ever huger leaps, on the spot. Maybe
the open confrontation with inequality as scandalon, or
stumbling stone for thought, suspicious of solutions, would
reopen and concretize horizons of the scientific search.
More of Camus’s Dr. Rieux then, than of charitable billion-
aires’ technological fixes?23
I am in no position to predict where science would
move instead, if it did face up more directly to inequal-
ity as a deontological signpost. On the largest level of
global strategies and structures, proposals have been made
by ethicists like Ruth Macklin (2004, 2008) and Solomon
R. Benatar (1998) and some by activists (e.g., de Ceni-
val 2008), who argue that medical research should ad-
dress the problem of global justice and the right to care
through financial commitments. As for the content of scien-
tific work—hypotheses, evidence, data, method—the med-
ical anthropologist Steven Feierman (2010) suggests—on
the basis of his ethnography of his university’s collaborative
medical research in Africa—that recognition of inequalities
in transnational health research should lead to a diversifica-
tion of models of evidence beyond randomized clinical tri-
als and to greater interest in local parameters and standards
and health systems research, instead of fixation on phar-
macologically driven vertical intervention. From a differ-
ent theoretical and methodological angle, the geographer
Simon Reid-Henry (2010), drawing on his ethnography of
the Cuban medical research sector, points to the possibility
of a different bioscientific epistemology, premised on recog-
nition ofmaterial needs and scarcity, combinedwith an em-
phatically open-ended horizon of possibility. The virtue of
these reflections from diverse disciplines lies not in offer-
ing ready solutions—proposing a new fund,more social sci-
ence, more local capacity building, and so on—but in con-
tributing to the debate on the possibility of another kind of
science.
Crucial to this debate is that material inequality—
between individuals, groups, territories, organizations, or
nations—translates into positioned interests. While it may
be easy enough to agree across lines of inequality that the
world would be a better place with less illness, hunger,
and suffering, propositions to engender social and scientific
progress are rooted in material positions and ownership.
That inequality produces conflicting interests seems obvi-
ous enough, yet it diverges from the underlying narratives of
“global health” (and similar 21st-century socioscientific en-
deavors like humanitarianism and environmentalism), ac-
cording to which a universal human cause, driven by ob-
jective science (or reason), would seem to inevitably be
shared by an ever-widening inclusive “we”—as in the var-
ious “causes of our generation,” from producing HIV vac-
cines or eradicating malaria to combatting climate change
or poverty. Making inequality and exclusion explicit instead
of unknowing them, underlines that these challenges are ul-
timately matters of contestation, struggles about material
boundaries, rights, and claims. Progress, then, is as much
about disagreement as agreement, and collaboration is a
site of conflict. I note above my sense of discomfort at the
smoothness of amodel of collaborative partnership that of-
ten unknows the presence of difference; under given mate-
rial conditions, collaboration is, andmust be recognized as,
uncomfortable.
Anthropologists as critics?
Unknowing raises questions about the stakes involved
when one “speaks truth”: What risk does it entail, for the
speaker’s relations and position and for the social order and
practices that that individual and his or her interlocutors
are part of? What is the anthropologist’s ethnographic
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and political contribution? How can one critique a social
constellation predicated on actively unknowing inequality?
Classic forms of enlightenment critique—revelation (of re-
ality) and iconoclasm (of false representations)—have less
purchase under conditions of unknowing. Nonknowledge
of the sort described here differs from older regimes of the
untrue, such as (e.g., religious) superstitions, false (e.g.,
class) consciousness, or (e.g., nationalist) ideology, as well
as from classic modernist knowledge–power compounds
embodied by disciplinary colonial tropical medicine (see
Packard 2007). Nonknowledge does not suppress truth and
thus cannot be remedied through better knowledge (pace
the “agnotologist’s” promises; see Proctor and Schiebinger
2008). Neither does the once fashionable multiplication of
“knowledges” of equal value adequately counter unknow-
ing. If everybody involved in a collaboration can tell truths
from untruths and engage both registers simultaneously,
anthropologists add little by “telling the truth” and even
less by relativist denial of such a distinction. Only by
attending ethnographically to the work of unknowing itself
can we begin to grasp the social processes that unknowing
enables and then proceed to discern, and engage in, their
contradictions.
The openness of responsibility
Beyond such ethnographic contributions to medical ethics,
anthropology’s way of knowing itself—and the different
ethics this entails—might have something to offer to over-
seas “trial communities.” Defending ethnography against
the “imperialism” of bioethical regulation (Schrag 2010),
Rena Lederman and colleagues discussed in this journal
(see “AE Forum: IRBs, Bureaucratic Regulation, and Aca-
demic Freedom,” November 2006) how unregulated, un-
funded “informal” fieldwork “at home,” in the anthro-
pologist’s everyday world, like all “real” fieldwork, aban-
dons work–life, formal–private distinctions that regula-
tory ethics presume. Rather than “human subjects,” such
work engages “social beings in historical circumstances,
including the ethnographer” (Fassin 2006:524). Gaining
knowledge by being-with implicates researcher and re-
searched, individually and together, in the politics of
the field; the “informality” of fieldwork conjoins persons,
who are always already relational and intertwines biogra-
phies as it transfers knowledge about lives (see Strath-
ern 2006). And if intersubjectivity is the foundation of
knowledge of the world—and anthropology’s claim in this
regard is meant to have wider purchase—then (multi-
sided!) responsibility is inseparable from the epistemolog-
ical endeavor. An anthropological ethics, then, is not con-
cerned with regulatory “protection” of subjects but with
“taking care” of and with relations with multiple others
(see Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and
Commonwealth 1999).
From here, rethinking scientific work in the
field-station situation could commence, decentering
“(bio)ethical imperialism” with insights from the academic
periphery: If station and field are simultaneously coinhab-
ited and studied, professional and domestic, public and
private, then knowing and being, epistemology and ethics,
experimentation and responsibility cannot be separate.
Knowing a field, then, begins by acknowledging that one is
present in it and that one’s shared presence with others is
the inevitable condition of knowledge. From this recogni-
tion, the undoing of unknowing begins. And as Strathern
notes in her contribution to the above debate, since such
responsibilities are “embedded in social situations not
defined by the parties themselves,” they require openness,
especially toward unresolved contradictions: “Closure
should not come too quickly” (2006:533).
Notes
Acknowledgments. I am grateful for the courageous support for
this ethnographic project from members of the NCRO–GHA trial
community. For this article, particular thanks go to the leadership
and the scientists of both organizations, who welcomed me and
my colleagues to study their work and constructively engaged in
debates and disagreements throughout research and writing. The
penultimate draft was presented publicly at theNCRO–GHA center,
and comments and critique were included in this version. Many of
those present on that occasion were in agreement with this article’s
argument about “known unknowns,” and my observations caused
little surprise. Yet the ensuing debates sharpenedmy attention to a
different question, which, alas, remains underexplored here: how
well-intentioned and eminently well-trained people try—despite
adverse conditions and the limits imposed by organizational struc-
tures, conceptual frames, knowledge, and sensitivities—to do the
right thing; how they realize (if not always publicly) mistakes and
failure and pursue incremental improvements; I take up this cru-
cial issue—more suited to extensive ethnography—in a forthcom-
ing monograph. While this text has been improved by the clarifi-
cations, criticisms, and advice of colleagues from GHA and NCRO,
the views expressed aremine and donot reflect (indeed, sometimes
differ from) those of NCRO, GHA, and their staffs. This article is of-
fered as a contribution to, and extension of, our discussions.
I was privileged to conduct extensive periods of fieldwork to-
gether with my colleagues Philister Madiega and Gemma Jones.
I have greatly benefited from conversations with our London
research group’s Ph.D. students studying clinical trials in differ-
ent African sites. Colleagues at workshops in Halle, Germany; Kilifi,
Kenya; and London, where earlier drafts were discussed in 2009–
10, provided valuable critique, as did my coworkers in the research
group “Anthropologies of African Biosciences.” I am most grate-
ful for continuous discussions with and uncompromising critique
and advice from Ruth Prince, during our shared fieldwork and ever
since. Thanks, finally to the anonymous but generous AE reviewers,
whose nuanced advice I only began to heed here.
1. I use experiment in this article as a value-neutral reference to
scientific hypothesis testing, which is central to improving scien-
tificmedicine; controlled trials, which in recent years have emerged
as the gold standard of medical, as well as, increasingly, social ex-
perimentation are one instantiation of the more or less formalized
forms of experiments that drive medical knowledge. I do not mean
the term to connote the negative associations sometimes carried
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by public discourse on “human experimentation.” I am grateful to
my medical colleagues from the “Government Health Agency,” for
whom the term evoked the latter, for alerting me to the potential
for misinterpretation.
2. This characteristically African configuration of transnational
science differs from that described by Adriana Petryna (2009; see
also Petryna 2002) in her pioneering work on international epi-
demiology and trials outside Africa, in that organizations and fund-
ing in African research sites are largely public—commercial inter-
ests being less prominent—and in that local clinical, diagnostic,
and research facilities, equipment, and expertise are not readily
available on-site (unlike in India or Ukraine) but have to be re-
stored, transferred, or custom-built within designated spaces. The
distinction between “public” and “for-profit” industrial research is
in my view an important analytical focus, notwithstanding the ob-
vious fact that public science and academic institutions have them-
selves been transformed in recent decades and have been reshaped
by economic and cultural models of audit and market.
3. I choose to “unknow” my main field site’s particulars both
because my descriptions are informed by comparative experience
from several similar large-scale scientific installations in Africa and
because it is not my intention to critique a particular institution or
its staff or to disturb important scientific investigations but to dis-
cuss general patterns.
4. The attractiveness of trial participation is witnessed not only
in long, early-morning queues when new trials recruit and in for-
mer participants’ persistent requests formore trials but also in phe-
nomena like double enrollment in multiple trials and manipulat-
ing pretrial “screening” (e.g., giving false information about sexual
behavior, age, place of residence, health status, or marital relation-
ships, which determine eligibility for a trial), tactics that necessitate
trial coordinators’ vigilance and technological innovations like fin-
gerprint databases.
5. GCP is a regulatory protocol, issued by the International
Conference on Harmonization (ICH), that details practical pro-
cedures, including those pertaining to ethical matters (consent,
incentives, etc.) around clinical trials. Endorsed by the FDA, re-
sponsible for licensing pharmaceuticals to the world’s largest
pharmaceutical markets, it is of crucial importance to the conduct
of clinical trials all over the world.
6. This is the common interpretation of “undue inducement,”
following the classic logic of the “gift to strangers” (Titmuss
1970; see Oakley and Barker 2004); recently, some more-market-
orientated ethicists have defended the rightfulness and necessity of
inducement, including straightforward payments, but their views
remain, as yet, a minority position (see Emanuel 2005).
7. Recurring confrontations with versions of difference—
unemployment and lack of food or dysfunctional government and
insufficient health care—continue to produce, despite the closure
that GCP implies, bioethical controversies (see Angell 2000; de
Cernival 2008).
8. After the end of our fieldwork, senior staff initiated a corporate
responsibility program funded by voluntary contributions (along-
side an initiative to provide benefits to surrounding communities
by letting them recycle waste paper and used furniture). Although
this project raised the profile of charitable actions and drew some
attention to material need, it remained separate from the sphere of
actual scientific production by avoiding the formal order of SOPs
and relying on private funding.
9. In the available public facilities, medicines are scarce and di-
agnostics largely unavailable, and even basic treatments, which
should be free of charge, may imply payments.
10. These contributions to well-being are to no little extent
an achievement of the 1990s political struggles about “standards
of care” in transnational HIV research (see Angell 1997; Lurie
and Wolff 1997). While these debates focused on the question
of whether “local” or “best” (i.e., U.S.) standards of HIV treat-
ment should be used as comparison in African controlled tri-
als, the underlying issue was the differences in health care tech-
nology and survival options associated with average African and
Euro-American medical settings. Academic debate brought these
differences temporarily to the fore. Widespread consensus that, in
principle, best standards of care should apply closed this debate as
far as controlled trials were concerned. Yet poor public health care
continues to raise questions (see, e.g., Kent et al. 2004) and has not
led to definite regulations or been commonly discussed in scholarly
publications or research protocols (for a provocative exception, see
de Cenival 2008); instead, responses to low standards of care are
relegated to the individual morality and authority of scientists im-
plementing clinical trials in practice.
11. This example underlines the continuities of unknowing be-
tween the research setting described here and the realms of pub-
lic administration and policy, where certain material conditions—
lack of drugs or hospital malfunctioning—tend to be systematically
unknown.
12. In two recent hospital-based studies in the area, scientists
observed that inpatientmortality had beenmore than halved in the
study group, not because of an intervention but by implementing
the hospitals’ own algorithms correctly. This very positive effect of
the trial will be reported, as a step toward greater openness and fur-
ther constructive critique of the health system.
13. This paradox was made clear by a senior North Ameri-
can researcher in Uganda, cited by Lotte Meinert (in press) as
quipping, “Which health system?” when asked why his organi-
zation did not integrate more into the government system; yet
the same project referred participants posttrial to local health
facilities.
14. To my knowledge, none of the ethical review boards I have
engaged with demands that research protocols that suggest refer-
ring participants “back” to public facilities display knowledge of the
quality of these facilities or document the actual public availabil-
ity of appropriate care, such as second- or third-line antiretroviral
medication.
15. In someNorthern contexts, research participants can be paid
to induce them to participate in trials. By contrast, I found in var-
ious African ethics review boards adamant objections to any form
of “incentive”; this might reflect stronger awareness among African
review board members of participants’ often abject poverty; ac-
cording to African scientists I informally spoke to in different sites,
it also is motivated by their fear that if monetary inducements were
permitted and thus expected by potential participants, it would
become impossible for African institutions (given their relative
poverty) to conduct human subject researchwithout overseas part-
ners.
16. There might be more material similarities between the lat-
ter than among the former. In large-scale collaborative sites,
income differences between research workers and expatriate
scientists, taking account of benefits, can amount to a factor of
30, and even incomes and allowances of similarly qualified scien-
tists employed, respectively, on “local” and “international” terms
are very different.
17. These quasi-racial connotations are transported through
ambiguous terms such as Kiswahilimzungu;while this term is used
for people with a “white” complexion, it can also designate the ex-
patriate social category, irrespective of skin color or particular so-
cial traits and behaviors. Discourses about class can thus take a
racial tinge and vice versa.
18. While the use of the term ghetto probably refers to North
American “black consciousness,” the areas referred to are socially
diverse and include informal settlements aswell as plannedflats for
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civil servants and mansions with all amenities. This internal class
structure and historical diversity are here glossed over by a simple
distinction of “sides.”
19. This use of political resonates with the inflationary use of
the term in academic institutions and organizations, and it carries
older values of science, and civil servants, as outside politics (see,
e.g., Geissler 2011).
20. Per diems have become a dominant feature of collaboration
in science and development across Africa since the late 1970s. Their
rise to prominence goes hand in hand with the economic depri-
vation of African governments (and the attendant decline of sci-
entists’ and doctors’ salaries) and the emergence of the collabora-
tive model of scientific coproduction. The institutional history of
per diems—as compared to other forms of transfers like the “top-
ups” of the 1970s, the government salaries and allowances of ear-
lier periods, and contemporary short-term contracts and volunteer
compensation—deserves historical study.
21. This is the case when experimental interventions or
research-based policies function insufficiently or have iatrogenic
effects (see Parker and Allen 2012). If, for example, a new HIV
treatment policy is introduced that relies on the availability of
specific groups of drugs that, according to official reports, should
be available in a given health system but are known not to be
or to be in inadequate supply, then the discrepancy between
institutional truths and practitioners’ experiences must be made
known to protect lives.
22. Claire Wendland shows how, for Malawian junior doctors,
confrontations with patient’s suffering lead to “diagnosis of po-
litical etiologies, and the proposition of political activity as ther-
apeutic intervention” (2012:42). Such politicization of social suf-
fering would be less likely to arise if, as in the case of doctors in
research collaborations, the confrontation with lack is cushioned
by research-related resources and by unknowing the social origins
of suffering.
23. The problem of articulating critical dissent within public
health today is instantiated by the medical anthropologist and
doctor Paul Farmer, the closest social and cultural anthropology
has come to producing a global moral icon. Apart from his ad-
mirable double act as clinician, moral voice, and scholar, his well-
considered oppositional stance vis-a`-vis the global health estab-
lishment and its “bioethics” has informeddebates for over a decade
(Farmer 2005). Yet even his medical-cum-anthropological enter-
prise Partners for Health (PIH) cannot escape the contemporary
idiom of transnational “partnership,” at the same time that its
fund-raising rhetoric relies on images of extreme poverty, behind
which the trope of “established star-academic at world’s richest
university cares for world’s poorest country patients”—Partner to
the Poor (Farmer 2010)—invites cynical critique. Without shar-
ing in these criticisms, I note that PIH’s self-representation does
underline the difficulty of articulating transformative social cri-
tique within a charitable endeavor under given political-economic
conditions.
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